I. Introduction
Because of asymmetric information, markets tend to fail due to moral hazard, adverse selection, and hold-up. Such problems tend to be serious in the context of the dynamic development of an economy, where new technologies are continuously adopted, new products are widely introduced, and new markets are successively developed. But if markets fail to function, an economy is unlikely to develop. Thus, the question is how such market failures can be reduced so as to stimulate the market-based development. In this paper we would like to explore whether effective mechanisms exist that reduce the extent of market failures by inducing the cooperative behaviors of transacting parties in developing countries.
While modern solutions involve the setting up of formal rules of market transactions by laws and legislations and the enforcement of such rules by police and judicial systems, the cost of contract enforcement by laws and regulations may be too high to be implemented in practice, particularly in low-income countries. Hayami (2009) argues that a rural community has an inherent informal mechanism to enforce contracts effectively among community members, partly because the members know each other very well and, hence, the information asymmetry is not so serious, and partly because the penalty for dishonest behavior is high in communities characterized by multifaceted and enduring personal relationships. 1 In such communities, social capital based on mutual trust will be developed to induce cooperative behavior, so that markets tend to work well. Hayami developed this idea based on his study of rural villages in the Philippines in collaboration with Kikuchi (Hayami and Kikuchi 1982) , and elaborated this idea further by applying it to the case of tenancy contracts (Hayami and Otsuka 1993) , and also to the case of the marketing of agricultural products in Indonesia (Hayami and Kawagoe 1993) .
The question arises as to whether similar mechanisms exist outside rural communities. In this connection, argue that the industrial cluster, which may be defined as a geographical concentration of enterprises producing similar and related products, is voluntarily formed by entrepreneurs, not necessarily from the same community, because of the benefits arising from an environment in which everybody knows everybody else and in which rumors can become quickly widespread, as in rural communities. Thus, the cost of contract enforcement is expected to be low within an industrial cluster, which explains, at least partly, why indigenously developed industries in developing countries are mostly cluster-based. 1 Hayami (e.g., 2009 ) argues that the community mechanism is effective not only for the enforcement of contract-based transactions but also for the management of local commons and the provision of local public goods. In this paper, however, we focus on the enforcement of contract-based transactions. 2 Here we distinguish between a cluster which has been established by local enterprises and one led
The first purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that the development of both rural communities and indigenously established industrial clusters is based commonly on the community mechanism of contract enforcement.
Because of the low transaction costs, the imitation of new ideas is rampant in industrial clusters. Thus, argue that private efforts to innovate fall short of the social optimum because of the information spillovers or imitation. So long as innovation is an engine of industrial development, the development of industrial clusters is hampered by imitation. There are several ways to overcome this market failure, such as the use of patent systems and the provision of government support for innovations. The same issue should potentially arise in rural communities where "imitation" or "learning from others" is a common practice. The second purpose of this article is to consider how to promote innovations in rural industries and the production of high-value crops in rural communities where information on new technology is widely shared.
The organization of this article is as follows. We review, firstly, Hayami's arguments on contract enforcement in rural communities in Section II and, secondly, the by foreign direct investment. We believe that the community mechanism of contract enforcement plays an essential role in the former case, whereas the hierarchical relationships between large foreign enterprises and small local enterprises play a critical role in the latter case.
empirical literature on industrial clusters in Section III. We discuss how the issue of weak incentives to innovate can be overcome in both industrial clusters and rural communities in Section IV. Finally we conclude this paper by providing policy implications for the development of both rural communities and industrial clusters.
II. Contract Enforcement in Rural Communities
According to Hayami and Godo (2005, p. 311) , the community is defined as "the organization that guides community members to voluntary cooperation based upon close personal ties and mutual trust…" Relationships of mutual trust are created and maintained through long-term, continuous, and multiple transactions among a group of people in the community. Since people know one another and meet regularly, and since they are engaged in similar and related activities (e.g., farming and processing of farm products), information asymmetry is not as serious as in outside societies.
Moreover, the circulation of malicious gossip by word of mouth will lead to heavy penalties for those who commit moral hazard or deviate from the norm of the community, which specifies mutual help and reciprocity. In his most recent article, Hayami (2009, p. 108) argues that "intensive social interactions of the community members entail the mechanism of punishing those who do not punish non-compliant members."
Thus, if a tenant shirks or fails to maintain soil fertility, his conduct is likely to not only be detected by his present landlord but also to be known by other community members including potential landlords, so that he will lose the opportunity to work as a tenant in his community. Indeed, share tenants, who are considered to shirk because of the disincentive effect of output sharing on a tenant's work effort (i.e., the so-called
Marshallian inefficiency of share tenancy), are found to work as hard as owner-cultivators and leasehold tenants according to the extensive review of empirical literature comparing output per hectare between share-tenanted land and land cultivated by owner-farmers and leasehold tenants (Otsuka and Hayami 1988; Otsuka et al. 1992; Otsuka 2007b) . This is likely due to the fact that landlords select trustworthy community members as share tenants, e.g., relatives and sons of close friends, so that the community mechanism of contract enforcement works. Such results are widely reported by empirical studies on share tenancy in Asia (e.g., Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Fukui 1997; Sadoulet, Fukui, and de Janvry 1994) .
3 Hayami (e.g., 1996 Hayami (e.g., , p. 1162 emphasizes the fundamental contribution of trading activities to the development of rural communities: "profitable opportunities created by new technology and improved infrastructure such as roads cannot be exploited without the activities of middlemen." According to Hayami and Kawagoe (1993) , in both long-settled Java and newly opened Sumatra, indigenous entrepreneurs belonging to the upper peasantry actively engaged in the collection of agricultural products such as fresh vegetables, corn, and soybeans, their processing, such as the production of tempe and tofu, and the shipment to large cities, such as Jakarta. These village-based traders out-competed town-based ethnic Chinese, particularly in the marketing of commercial vegetables to Jakarta, which is complicated and risky as both the supply and demand change everyday in unpredictable fashion and the products are highly perishable. The strength of these village-based traders lies in their ability to enforce contracts with farmers and low-rank collectors by means of the community mechanism of contract enforcement. This is particularly the case in the marketing of fresh vegetables for which effective coordination between farm-level collection and bulk shipment to urban markets is the key operation. Small farmers benefit from the sale of commercial crops to village-based traders, as the trading sector is highly competitive. In this way, the community mechanism of contract enforcement contributes to the development of rural communities and the enhancement of the well-being of the rural population.
As Asian economies have grown rapidly, the importance of non-farm income in rural households has grown enormously, which directly contributes to the significant reduction in rural poverty (Hayami and Kikuchi 2000; Otsuka, Estudillo, and Sawada 2009 ). There is a tendency that rural non-farm jobs do not require as much education as urban jobs and, hence, even uneducated rural workers can find reasonably remunerative non-farm jobs. Recognizing the importance of rural industrialization, Hayami (1998) observes the critical role played by relational contracting based on long-term and continuous contract relations between small, rural-based manufacturers and traders or agents of large, urban-based enterprises, as well as between rural based manufacturers and their workers. Traders bring marketing information regarding urban and foreign markets and new production methods to the rural communities, and often provide credit to local producers as well. A typical case is the putting-out contract, in which the designs and materials are provided by traders without requiring advance payments. Otsuka (1998) observes that many of the owners/managers of rural enterprises have had work experience at the urban enterprises with which they have subcontract relationships. Thus, the trust forged through long-term employer-employee and contractor-subcontractor relationships contributes to the development of rural industries. Needless to say, such rural producers are born in the locality where they operate factories, so that they know many of their employees personally.
III. Contract Enforcement in Industrial Clusters

Advantages of Industrial Clusters
Manufacturing industries in developing countries, which have been initiated by native entrepreneurs, are mostly cluster-based and led by SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises), particularly in low-income countries. Good examples are the garment and shoe industries. Machinery industries are also often clustered, as the inter-enterprise transactions of a large number of parts and components are required for the production of final products. In our observation, the formation of industrial clusters has been booming in many areas of China, where they had been suppressed by the socialist system and by the policies of township and village governments to promote township-and village-enterprises engaged in non-competing businesses. At present, industrial clusters are ubiquitous not only in East Asia, including Japan and Taiwan, but also in Southeast and South Asia and, to a lesser extent, sub-Saharan Africa.
According to Marshall (1920) , the advantages of industrial clusters or agglomeration economies are: (1) information spillovers or imitation, (2) the division and specialization of labor among enterprises producing parts, components, and final products, and (3) the development of skilled labor markets. While we do not have any objections to these advantages associated with industrial clusters, we would like to point out that the major sources of information spillovers are the leakage of technological information by part-suppliers and skilled workers recruited from innovative enterprises.
Thus, information spillovers, the division of labor, and the development of skilled labor markets are intimately related. 
Two Types of Industrial Clusters
Urban and rural industrial clusters differ in the type of products produced, the type of entrepreneurs who lead the cluster development, and the way in which the industries are initiated. In urban areas, a variety of goods and abundant human resources with a variety of skills and knowledge are available. Such diversity and scale of urban economic activities turns out to be an advantage for the production of skill-intensive products and products that requires a variety of intermediate inputs. A typical product of urban industrial clusters is machinery, whose production requires substantial skills and mechanical knowledge as well as a large number of parts and materials. Since engineers are often the founders, we call this type of clusters "engineer-led" . As the cluster grows large and gets congested, it often sprawls out or is relocated to the suburbs.
Urban industrial clusters can be viewed as quasi-communities, in which the community mechanism of contract enforcement functions even though the constituents are not necessarily from the same community. We observed such quasi-communities in the machine-tool cluster in Taichung, Taiwan (Sonobe, Kawakami, and Otsuka, 2003) , the motorcycle cluster in Hamamatsu, Japan and in Chongqing, China (Yamamura, Sonobe, and Otsuka 2005; Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka 2006) , and the metalworking and car-repair cluster in Kumasi, Ghana.
On the other hand, the advantage of rural areas in manufacturing lies in the abundance of low wage labor. However, this advantage will be realized only if the production using low-wage labor is connected to large demand in urban or foreign markets. Thus, the central players in the development of rural industrial clusters tend to be traders, even though some rural industries may be initiated by ex-farmers.
Because of the necessity of the link to urban and foreign markets, the location of rural clusters cannot be too far away from major cities. In addition, because their advantage comes from the abundance of low-wage labor, their location is characterized also by weak comparative advantage in agriculture due to the shortage of large fertile land areas.
These conditions for the development of rural industrial clusters are quite similar to those for the development of nonfarm and new high-value crop sectors in rural communities. Thus, rural industrial clusters are trader-led and develop precisely because of the advantage of the community relations discussed by Hayami. Because a variety of skilled workers and engineers are unavailable in rural areas, technically advanced or complicated products are not produced in rural industrial clusters. Instead, the typical products are garments and shoes, woodwork products, and simple metal products, according to our own case studies mostly in Asia.
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Roles of Traders in Industrial Clusters
In what follows, we would like to show that traders play the role of entrepreneurs in rural industrial clusters by reviewing the development of the following four rural clusters: (1) the garment industry in Bingo in Japan (Yamamura, Sonobe, and case of the leather shoe industry in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, which has been growing rapidly (Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka 2009). 5 In each of these five industrial clusters, there are 100 to 1,000 manufacturing enterprises producing final products, aside from parts-suppliers and traders.
There is remarkable resemblance between the garment clusters in Bingo in Hiroshima Prefecture in Japan and in Jili (which can also be spelt Zhili) in Zhejiang Province in China. First, they are located in rural areas but not so far away from large cities (e.g., 200 km), which are Osaka in the case of Bingo and Shanghai in the case of Jili.
6 Secondly, because of the poor soil and limited availability of farmland, the wives and other members of farm households had to supplement their meager farm incomes by weaving traditional cotton cloth (called kasuri) in the case of Bingo and producing pillow-cases and other miscellaneous merchandise in the case of Jili. Thirdly, to sell these products, local traders traveled around various parts of the country, and in this way the tradition of commerce was established in these rural townships. Fourthly, it was these local traders who introduced the current major products, that is, working clothes in Bingo and infant clothing in Jili.
5 Although unreported in this paper, the role of traders and family ties are also critically important in the development of the garment clusters in Nairobi (Akoten and Otsuka 2007; Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka 2006) . 6 Although Jili has become urbanized, it was a poor rural area when its successful industrialization began. This is also the case in Wenzhou.
In Bingo, the development of the garment industry was led by former local traders who used to deal in traditional cotton cloth. Their presence remained strong for many years after the industry was initiated before the war. Even as of 1968, the enterprises owned and operated by the former local traders accounted for 41% (see Table 1 ). The spin-offs, i.e., imitators who had worked for other garment enterprises before, accounted for 42% to 56% for several decades since the late 1960s. Their entry was prompted by the high entrepreneurial profits earned by their employers, that is, the former local traders. As such new entry expanded the production of the cluster, the division of labor involving a large number of small subcontractors specializing in particular parts of the entire production process was highly developed. This development rested on the community mechanism of contract enforcement, like rural industrialization in other places of Asia (Hayami 1998; Otsuka 1998 Otsuka , 2007b . It is also interesting to observe that the former local traders were not only the first to produce the factory production system to the Bingo area but also the first to deal directly with large urban retailers, such as department stores, when indirect transaction with small retailers through local traders was the common practice. Direct transactions with urban retailers became profitable for the former local traders because they began producing high-quality, differentiated products. In general, increases in direct transactions are associated with quality improvement and attempts to establish brand names.
In Jili, the proportion of managers who were formerly marketing specialists (i.e., local traders and those who had worked at the marketing division of the garment enterprises) gradually increased, as marketing assumed increasing importance in the development process of the garment town (see Table 2 ). Like their counterparts in Bingo, they produced higher-quality products and engaged more actively in direct transactions with urban traders, and achieved higher labor productivity. According to Fleisher et al. (2009) , the last decade has witnessed a great development of the subcontracting system in the Jili cluster, which now ranks as one of the largest production centers of children clothing in the world.
The production of electric fittings, such as power outlets and switches, in Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province was initiated by a farmer in his teens, but the development of this industry was led by local traders. Similar to the garment town of Jili, Wenzhou used to be a poor rural area and had a strong tradition of commerce, in which low-quality merchandise produced by farm households were sold by local traders in large cities across the country. Indeed, "made in Wenzhou" used to be synonymous with inferior products for Chinese consumers. The electric fitting enterprises in Wenzhou, therefore, had to overcome this bad reputation in order to market their improved products when consumers with rising income levels became increasingly fastidious about product quality from the late 1980s. This challenge was first achieved by a former trader in the late 1980s. His successful strategy was imitated first by former traders. Moreover, the massive new entry of former traders began in this period (Table 3) . Clearly, the development of this cluster is trader-led.
After improving the quality of their products, the entrepreneurs employed a number of sales agents selling their products in major cities across the country. They prohibited the sales agents from dealing in products of other producers in order to differentiate their improved products from the low-quality products of other enterprises and to establish their brand names. While the use of sales agents might invite the agency problem, each of the leading enterprises employed hundreds of agents. The reason why they did so was that there were a large number of traders who had migrated from Wenzhou and settled in major cities. We found that more than 95% of the sales agents were such Wenzhou traders. Thus, the electric fitting enterprises used the community mechanism of contract enforcement in long-distance transactions between the major urban markets and the industrial cluster.. Table 4 , similar observations can be made in the garment cluster in the suburbs of Hanoi, which has a tradition of producing garment products for the last several decades under the socialist system. There are thousands of household workshops producing parts for large registered enterprises under subcontracts, and the owners of the small workshops visit large enterprises almost every day to receive materials and deliver finished parts. Obviously, the community mechanism of contract enforcement is at work in coordinating the dense subcontracting relationships with a large number of household producers, all of whom are native residents in the community.
As is shown in
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Reflecting the increasing importance of improving product quality and the marketing of such products, the number of former local traders increased appreciably after 2000. Also the fact that the number of years of prior experience working at a garment factory increased indicates the increasing importance of spin-offs in this cluster.
This garment cluster is the home village of a large number of Vietkieu or overseas
Vietnamese traders who went to Russia and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and started small businesses. Once they settled there, they began going back and forth between their home village and Russia or Eastern Europe to engage in the exporting of the garment products. They tend to choose manufacturers who are relatives in order to take advantage of the community mechanism of contract enforcement. Surprisingly, a common practice is that these Vietkieu pay the local producers only once a year after
Christmas, that is, after a major business season. Such contracts can hardly be agreed upon by local producers without strong trust. Interestingly, both prior marketing experience and the number of Vietkieu relatives are the critical variables that significantly affected the value added and export ratio of the enterprises, according to regression analyses.
In Addis Ababa, there are more than 1,000 small and informal workshops producing leather shoes. The vast majority are concentrated in a small area behind a very large bazaar, called Mercato. Unlike the four rural industrial clusters reviewed previously, this is an urban-based industrial cluster which has been created historically over several decades. Besides the cluster near Mercato, a handful of medium size enterprises employing several hundred workers are located in the government-sponsored industrial zones. It should be noted that these medium-sized enterprises were originally as small as informal workshops in the cluster. Table 5 demonstrates that the enterprise sizes in terms of the number of employed workers are larger for entrepreneurs whose parents were engaged in the shoe business and for those who have operated shoe businesses longer.
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The data on the successful medium-sized enterprises are shown in the lower-right part of the table.
Interestingly, almost 90% of the micro and small shoe makers belong to the same minor ethnic group and are originally from the same rural area located about 170 km south of Addis Ababa. The sons of the farmers in this area came to Addis Ababa to learn the tools of trade, which may be retailing, wholesaling, sewing, shoemaking, or something else, from relatives or acquaintances by working for them. Later they would start their own businesses. In the case of shoemakers, they would buy leather and other materials from material suppliers in Mercato and sell their products to wholesalers who market them in Addis Ababa and remote cities. The majority of the material suppliers and wholesalers are originally from the same area. It is highly likely that community mechanisms for both mutual aid and contract enforcement have played important roles in the development of this cluster. This anecdote is reminiscent of the story of waste pickers and collectors in Delhi, India, who migrated from Uttar Pradesh (Hayami, Dikshit, and Mishra 200x) .
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In this cluster, however, the traditional community of one ethnic group may lose 9 The same tendencies are observed for the value added and the average price of the products. 10 Although unreported here, community, kinship, and family ties are strong in the garment cluster in Nairobi (Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka 2007) and in the iron and steel cluster in Northern Vietnam (Nam, Sonobe, and Otsuka 2009b) .
its importance in the future. While it has helped the large cluster emerge, it has failed to promote the development of a modern industry producing high-quality products on a large scale. One of the interesting new developments is that some of the second-generation entrepreneurs are turning their workshops into modern semi-mechanized factories and exporting their products to the European market. More interestingly, the owners of small workshops, wholesalers, and material suppliers of various ethnic groups from different parts of the country have recently established a large cooperative with one thousand members. Its purpose is to facilitate the division of labor, to increase the use of specialized machines, to diffuse modern production techniques, to provide micro credit loans, and the market products under a few unified brand names. In other words, the cooperative is attempting to take full advantage of being clustered or the benefits of the quasi-community. This overwhelmingly interesting attempt is led by a young wholesaler. We would like to keep close watch on whether this social entrepreneur will achieve probably the first remarkable success in case of trader-led industrial development in Africa.
IV. Community as a Potential Obstacle to Innovations
As in other sectors of the economy, successful innovation is the key to the development of industrial clusters. More often than not new industries in developing countries are born based on the imitation of imported commodities from developed countries. Needless to say, the initiation of new production is an innovation, as it is risky and the establishment of a production system using poor substitutes for unavailable parts, materials, and machines is not an easy task. Indeed, the initiator receives Schumpeterian entrepreneurial profit. Such profit attracts a swarm of imitators, which tend to result in the "excess supply" of low-quality products, decreased product prices, and lowered profitability of producing low-quality products. found that in order for an industrial cluster to keep growing, it has to have another set of innovations for upgrading product quality, production organization, and marketing methods. The production of an improved product may be achieved simply by employing designers, engineers, and skilled workers, and by using some machines and expensive materials. While a higher-quality product is more costly to produce, however, it cannot command a higher price in the market until consumers are convinced that the product quality has been improved.
Therefore, brand names must be established and products must be sold directly to large retailers or through exclusive sales agents. Since the improved products are differentiated products, their production requires new specific parts, which embody new ideas. Thus, the entrepreneur must build a long-term relationship with trustworthy parts-suppliers or produce key parts internally. In order to assure the high quality of products, a quality control system and a labor management system are required. If they are successful in such product and management innovations, the entrepreneurs should look for export possibility and expansion of production by merger and by receiving loans from the formal financial sector. Although, each "innovation" may be better termed as an "improvement," carrying out such multi-faceted "improvements" is a formidable task.
Thus, the entrepreneurs who introduce innovations to the industrial clusters are highly educated. Tables 1 to 5 show that the schooling levels of enterprise managers were high and increased over time faster than the national averages in the respective countries. Furthermore, the schooling of enterprise managers is a highly significant variable in explaining the frequent use of direct transactions, the high prices of products, and other indicators of product quality not only in our East Asian studies ) but also in all other studies we have conducted. The availability of useful human resources for innovations, such as skilled workers, engineers, and parts-suppliers is a distinct advantage of industrial clusters in carrying out multi-faceted innovations.
Another factor affecting the successful innovations is learning from abroad.
Although we have only anecdotal evidence, entrepreneurs in Taiwan learned much from the Japanese experience, those in China learned from Taiwan and Japan, and those in Vietnam are learning from China. As is shown in Table 5 , some of the most successful shoemakers in Addis Ababa travel abroad, mostly to Italy, several times per year to obtain new knowledge. In other words, the international transfer of technology and management know-how contributes to the innovations in industrial clusters in developing countries.
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A major obstacle to the development of industrial clusters is the rampant imitation of innovations, which reduces the private returns to innovation below the social returns.
Thus, the multi-faceted innovations for quality improvement would not take place as much as they should from the viewpoint of the society or the cluster as a whole.
Patent protection is infeasible, as many of the new ideas are improvement types. The insufficient incentive to innovate is also a major obstacle to the development of rural communities. Recognizing this issue, Hayami (2009, p. 115) points out: "Our knowledge is grossly insufficient on the ways and means to induce the community mechanism to act toward promoting innovation in response to changes in economic environment."
11 Such transfer of production and management knowledge is seldom found in other industrial clusters in SSA. It seems to us that many of the enterprise managers in this region do not know what and where to learn to improve the management of their enterprises.
There are a few countermeasures to the insufficient innovation problem. One is to organize "community" actions. In order to supply a large volume of improved and standardized farm products in a large volume, small farmers form production and marketing groups in some cases, while others participate in collective production schemes organized by cooperatives, and in some other places, larger farmers interpretation of his argument is that social entrepreneurs may be able to create a mood or an incentive system to appreciate inventions and improvements made by other members of a rural community or an industrial cluster and to recognize them as contributions to the welfare of the community. Such recognition may encourage farmers or enterprise managers to attempt innovations even if imitations are expected to be rampant. According to Hayami (1996 Hayami ( , 1998 Hayami ( , 2009 , social entrepreneurs can be efficient providers of new business information as a local public good. For example, a village association can function as a community technology center which introduces advanced knowledge and collects market information for the association members.
How far such organized community actions led by social entrepreneurs can contribute to the improvement of farm or manufactured products remains to be seen.
In our view, the government or international organizations should take the initiative in providing technological and management knowledge conducive to innovations to promising social entrepreneurs. We also consider the provision of such knowledge to business entrepreneurs rather than social entrepreneurs. advocate training programs in which enterprise managers learn the skills of marketing, quality and production. Such entrepreneurial training will have greater effects if it is provided to enterprise managers in stagnant clusters who are thirsty for new knowledge.
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V. Concluding Remarks
It is difficult to assess how the development of industrial clusters benefits from the community mechanism of contract enforcement for industrial production outside clusters is so uncommon that the comparison of clusters and non-clusters is infeasible in many industries. Moreover, punishment on the dishonest behaviors by the community will be seldom observed, if it is, in fact, effective. Nonetheless, the fact that transactions are highly active in industrial clusters in a large number of countries indicates that industrial clusters are equipped with an excellent mechanism of contract enforcement which reduces transaction costs and facilitates the division and specialization of labor among manufacturers and between them and traders.
As Hayami forcefully argues, the community and the market are complementary, as the community mitigates market failures. In this respect, industrial clusters are no different from rural communities. Hence, assisting the formation of industrial clusters by investing in infrastructure in general and in industrial zones in particular makes sense.
Then, all three pillars of economic organizations, i.e., community, market, and state, ought to play complementary roles in the development of industrial clusters.
From the viewpoint of sustainable economic development, the critical question is how to create social and economic environments conducive to innovations in rural communities and industrial clusters. Since the transaction of information, which cannot be patented, is known to be costly, markets for innovative ideas are non-existent or fail to function. This market failure can be resolved by the community mechanism, if the community has the capacity to organize community actions and supply "local public goods" efficiently. It is, however, possible that the government, international organizations, or aid agencies in developed countries may be in a better position to fill the gap between the social and private net benefits from innovations, probably by carrying out the international transfer of relevant knowledge. An exploration of how to design efficient systems toward innovations for rural communities and industrial clusters will be a major remaining issue in development economics. 
